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NOSTALGIA/FORGETTING/HOPE
David L. Blaney

Perhaps my most serious confrontation with Hungary has come
in the reading of Imré Mádach’s The Tragedy of Man. This dramatic poem turns on an ongoing dialogue between Adam and
Lucifer on the meaning of existence. As Adam experiences the
expanse of human history — as a Pharaoh; a Roman general; a
Crusader; the scientist Kepler; Danton; a London proletarian;
and an observer of a rational scientific future and a time near the
end of human habitation of the earth, as the sun grows dim —
Adam clings to hope in the face of Lucifer’s acute observations
about human limits and failings. George Szirtes, the translator,
reminds us that “the argument is the drama.” One of our speakers, Eniko" Bollobás, described The Tragedy of Man (first published in 1861) as a classic of Hungarian literature and as
exemplary of the Hungarian national character. The back cover
of the Corvina edition (1995) describes it as a work of “lasting
interest” with “relevance in an ever-changing world.” Whatever
its status, I have found Mádach useful in giving a bare organization to this series of reflections.
I.
What potent words are kin and property,
Like two great levers that shall move the world,
They will give birth to every pain and pleasure.
The two ideas will grow continuously,
Creating nations and industries,
Begetting greatness and nobility,
Devouring, in time, their own progeny.
Imré Mádach, The Tragedy of Man (p. 42)
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Barely a week beyond the seminar, I found myself in a village
outside of Leipzig, in the flat of a third-generation German
Marxist. It was a breath of fresh air. In a closed room full of cigarette smoke the air was no more breathable than Prague’s, but
the discussion seemed fresh. Somehow the old-fashioned Marxism of class analysis, the contradictions of capitalism, and
worker internationalism, so recently marginalized by neoliberal
triumphalism and late or postmodern skepticism, seemed
vibrant, youthful, energetic. He argued that the new fashion in
Marxism was precisely old-fashioned Marxism. It all sounded a
bit naïve and dangerous (as things youthful often seem) despite
the nostalgia I had discovered in myself for simpler Cold War
times.
But the nostalgia was real: across East and Central Europe I
looked in vain for signs of a vision of a socialist alternative
beyond the relics of communist sculpture displayed at a local
theme park in Budapest. In the seminar, I found tiresome our
speakers’ preoccupation with the ill-legacy of communism, the
problems of stabilizing liberal capitalist social and political institutions, and the desperation to reassert national pride by rejoining and being recognized as an equal with the “West.” At the
same time, I found this reaction on my part equally troubling.
The temptation was to make our speakers uncomfortable with
their own commitments, attempting to dispel what seemed to be
taken as given or natural — the nation, the state, capitalism, the
“West.” But after doing so, could I give our speakers a viable
option to some version of Western liberal capitalism? Not
clearly so. It is an uncomfortable position: although the end of
the Cold War seems to have made everything and anything possible, it has made no particular alternative a compelling option
to capitalism.
II.
We have the common good for compensation.
(p. 173)
This is madness —it’s really most disturbing
To see such spectres of the past in this
Enlightened age...
(p. 230)
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The irony is that even though the Cold War was credited with
fossilizing historical possibilities, the last period of oppositional
politics in East and Central Europe inspired leftists in the West
to attach creative political possibilities to the “rise of civil society.” Leftist disenchantment with the state and the market led to
a focus on civil society, conceived as a sphere or space of selforganizing association between state and market but not quite
of either. The supposedly self-organizing quality of civil society
meant that scholars could conceive of civil society as a source of
social creativity, participatory experiments, and emancipatory
action free from and in conflict with the alienated, hierarchical,
rationalized determinations of state and market. Various forms
of opposition to the state socialisms of East and Central Europe
were seen to parallel the new social movements of West Europe
and North America as part of a convergent oppositional politics.
Actual connections between movements and organizations on
both sides of the Iron Curtain lent credence to this interpretation. This enthusiasm has continued with the end of the Cold
War as civil society is now theorized as a cross-national or even
global phenomenon that might, because of its autonomous quality, initiate a political project of societal protection from state
power and market forces.
However, it seems that the postcommunist project in East and
Central Europe appears principally as a means of contracting
and moderating these possibilities. Civil society is domesticated
as civic society modeled on the experience of the “West.” Civic
virtues are to be cultivated in a sphere of voluntary social attachments that somehow mediate and transform the clash of selfinterests operative in the market. This civic-mindedness is to be
exercised intermittently in the formal institutions of political
life. Here, civic-mindedness is not meant to indicate radical or
transformational politics, but the centrist, secular, stable, and
moderately tolerant politics associated with a modern liberal
capitalist society.
The appeal of both visions of a civil or civic society rests on
the capacity of an autonomous sphere of associational life to create in the citizenry a recognition of common bonds and a common good despite the divisions of interest and power created in
contemporary market society. The claim is compelling only if
we can think of a civil society of civic-mindedness or a civil soci203
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ety of the solidarity of social activism as in reality separable and
mostly insulated from the determinations of the market and the
state.
Much thinking has been devoted to this issue. It was Hegel
who theorized the role of intermediate associations between
family and state as a site for the taming of competitive self-interest created in liberal societies. It is important that Hegel did not
posit some space for civil society fully autonomous of state and
market. On the contrary, civil society and state are mutually
determining and interpenetrating; rather than independent of
the state, civil society depends on a limited but activist state for
its establishment and maintenance. Likewise, the market is a key
institution of civil society; civil society is made possible by a
regime of rights, including property rights, that legally constitute people as individuals and substantively constitute them as
individual agents of exchange and association. Perhaps as a consequence, Hegel himself was convinced that such intermediate
associations are necessary but not sufficient to create the social
bonds required to hold citizens together in a form of social life
where individualism, property, and self-interest are central.
Rather, he saw that the kind of social bonds required for the
pursuit of collective purposes were forged primarily in times of
mobilization for war. Hegel’s argument may appear prescient
but ultimately unsatisfying to anyone watching the bloody creation of civil societies in the new states of the former Yugoslavia.
Marx is usefully read as a response to the relative optimism of
Hegel’s reconciliation of liberal individualism and social unity
and purpose. For Marx, the possibility of collective purpose that
Hegel found in the unity of family, civil society, and state institutions — the State — is merely formal, where substantive divisions and relations of power and domination exist in society.
That is, “collective purpose” in a capitalist society is another
name for a social project of domination by a narrow stratum of
society. It is not hard to observe the rise of that stratum in postcommunist Hungary even if measured only by the Mercedes
Benzes and Jaguars peppering the streets. Or we might measure
it by the character of government policy — whether by shock
therapists or gradualists, liberals or socialists—where liberalization means dispossessing average people of a right to job security and eroding their savings and hence consuming capacity.
204
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Thus, along with Marx, we might read the civic-mindedness of a
civic society so sought for by our Hungarian colleagues as the
politics of a people seeking domestication by capitalism. That
such a society may only be discomforted as opposed to being
torn apart by class struggle is partial testament to Hegel’s observation (or prediction) of the allure of nationalism and the power
of war and threat of war to create and reinvigorate nations.
III.
..., in the old classroom,
The life there is not all economy,
Not yet.
(p. 188)
Eternal hope, forgetfulness —if only
They were not in league with destiny, . . .
(p. 251)
What appears most troubling about all of this is the narrowness of thinking associated with the idea of postsocialist or posttotalitarian “transition.” That is, successful “transition” seems to
mean instantiating and stabilizing a particular set of institutions
and social practices out of the myriad possibilities that appeared
to exist with the collapse of actually existing communism. But is
there another game in town? Are we left with Joan Robinson’s
ditty that the only thing worse than being exploited by a capitalist is not being exploited by a capitalist? Or, perhaps better,
where has the old-fashioned leftist project gone?
The new fashion centers on other issues: the politics of identity or recognition. Or is it the politics of a lack of a clear and certain identity? Our ideals of civil society, liberal or left, posit the
existence of an at once personal and public space for (critical)
reflection on our collective social and political practices. Such a
social space presumes plurality — divergent viewpoints and disparate actors — yet depends on sustaining relations of mutual
regard and respect among the actors, sometimes said to be
embodied in the commitment to certain rules of public discourse. That is, a basic sort of egalitarianism is the foundation of
civil society. The problem is deciding which social actors count
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as worthy of equal regard. If respect for equality and plurality
are foundations of civil society, then this space is by necessity
normalizing in that it will restrict actors and ways of life inconsistent with these particular ends and means. In Hungary, for
instance, they face urgent problems of what to do with former
communists, skinheads, and Gypsies — all seemingly uncommitted to the preconditions of a civil society. Other issues, like
the role of women and homosexuals, seem less pressing where
the official agenda is limited to stabilizing minimally democratic
institutions. Thus, civil society always involves privileging certain forms of difference and constructing certain actors and
ways of life as “others,” as antisocial, but the process and consequences of such denial of recognition may appear more or less
arbitrary depending on where you stand. It is the problem of
“standpoint” in the denial of recognition in the face of difference
that motivates much of leftist scholarship and action, resulting
often in a defense of quite radical claims of difference. But where
are we left when radical claims of plurality disable civil society
itself and the foundations of our collective reflections on our
common social life?
While it is clear, then, that a politics of identity and recognition is constitutive or foundational of any ongoing struggle to
stabilize or destabilize contemporary or wannabe civil societies,
traditional questions of social justice within a class-divided civil
society may come to appear secondary to these seemingly prior
issues. How can we confidently speak of social justice where the
pressing concern is the basis of societal membership, of the
bounds of society itself? It appears that it is precisely the idea of
a common social life that is disputed.
However, issues of class and the political economy of capitalism more generally are equally constitutive or foundational of
civil society, its antinomies, and the possibilities of a radical
political project. What it means to be an actor within (even if
also in opposition to) civil society is to possess agency. Agency
is the capacity to initiate and at least to some degree to realize
projects in the world. It is quite difficult to argue that agency
within civil society is unaffected by the operation of market society. In a market, actors must generate wealth on their own —
through means of their own capital or labor — in order to support the activities that make up their way of life. We know that
206
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wealth can be used to generate information, create publicity,
and lubricate the wheels of government; it is quite plausible to
argue that, in practice, the greater one’s access to wealth the
greater one’s agency as a social and political actor. Further, in
market society your value as a person is in large part determined by your place in a hierarchy of wealth and income. That
is, there is a way in which the rich are more “persons” than
those lower in the status hierarchy. There is even some threshold of access to wealth below which human beings individually
and in groups cease to be recognized as people altogether, and
appear to lose any basis for agency in their society. The frustrations surrounding efforts to recover agency for the poorest or to
locate an unambiguous site for an anticapitalist agency within a
market society suggest that we cannot ignore the way issues of
class are issues of identity, recognition, and agency.
To the extent that we live in a global political economy, the
relative economic success of countries or ways of life constitutes
a similar status hierarchy. We might think of this situation as
creating a hierarchy of cultures of civil societies within a global
culture of competitive capitalism — a global civil society perhaps. This valuation of cultures is captured in a rich vocabulary
of gradations of economic success and potential: advanced and
backward; developed, underdeveloped, and, more optimistically, developing; modern and traditional, where modernization
is a strategy for upward mobility. Political economists were
clear from the beginning: wealth is a condition of civilization
and the contrast between our wealth and their material poverty
a verification of our civility and modernity. Again, locating
resistance to this culture from a position within has been equally
frustrating for the Left. Recently, the Left has pinned much hope
on the nonmodern as a source of resistance. Or, claims of a
sphere of (global) civil society, purified of the determinations of
capitalism, has gladdened the heart of leftists who imagine their
NGO or academic institution to be occupants of such an insulated social space. However, where the nonmodern is everywhere polluted by the modern, and civil society is market
society, we all find ourselves partly immersed, nay constituted,
by the very forces we hope to resist. That is, we find our capacity
for agency intimately tied to social relations we mean to repudiate. This constitutes the hope of a resistance that does not in part
207
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partake of and reproduce capitalist modernity as a matter of forgetting, of erasing the presence of the powerful forces that shape
it and us.
IV.
[We] would prefer to take a general view
(p. 210)
The whole world is a single nation now
[but]
I fear too big a world will not be loved
As much as the soil in which our parents lie.
(p. 207)
The desire to establish a Hungarian civil or civic society may
seem paradoxical in an age of globalization. The existence of a
Hungarian society and identity are premised on the continuity
of the familiar political architecture of modernity — people,
nation, and state. However, many argue that this political architecture is increasingly challenged by a world of global processes
and local resistances, transborder relations and flows, and
migrations and mixings. For instance, asserting the sovereignty
of the Hungarian people immediately involves the Hungarian
state in difficult relations with the states and ethnically Hungarian populations of Romania and Slovakia as well as with minorities inside its own borders. Opening Hungary to the world will
create an increasingly diverse population, including opportunity seekers of all sorts (from educated Westerners fleeing recession to Asian entrepreneurs and less-skilled immigrant workers
from countries neighboring and afar), as well as involve its citizenry in activities and associations that compete with a narrow
Hungarian allegiance. Being free to pursue national wealth
within a global division of labor may generate wealth at some
level for the nation but, at the same time, it makes the national
livelihood dependent on the collective valuation of the nation’s
products and its culture in a global market. In addition, becoming rich (if they are so fortunate) may incorporate Hungarian
consumers into a mode of consumption that increasingly
appears to have little that is distinctively Hungarian about it.
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And, finally, seeking recognition as an equal within Europe via
EU membership entails at the same time some diminution and
subordination of national sovereignty and identity to Europe.
Thus, establishing civil society appears as an attempt to fit oneself into an increasingly problematic order.
Despite the specter of homogenization (“McWorld,” as it is
fashionably dubbed), it is forces of globalization and the concomitant fracturing and localization that appear to be a source of
the kind of alternative political possibilities that are mostly
absent in the notion of postsocialist transition. That is, if the
familiar political architecture is indeed being undermined by
global processes and problems as well as local resistances and
identities, we may require new configurations of political space
that recognize global society and link the global and local in
ways hitherto unimagined. However, there is no blueprint for
ordering a world exhibiting forms of commonality and difference that cannot be captured by the nation-state and the existing
blueprints for civil society. Nor are we certain of the agencies
required to put such a new world into place. We exist in a time
where the old is far from eclipsed but where there are forces
afoot that compel us to try to understand and act in the globe in
different, and mostly yet to be determined, ways. It is precisely
at such times that our need of a sure sense of agency confronts
our lack of a clear basis for action; the illusion of a sure agency is
salvaged only by refusing doubt and imposing clarity of purpose where none exists.
The aspirations of our Hungarian speakers seem understandable as a response to this world we now inhabit, even if limited
given the need for new political thinking. What is much more
puzzling to me is why I was there and what my own goals were.
Officially the seminar was part of an effort to internationalize
the Macalester College faculty. But despite the arguable value of
“international” experience, I remain confused about what
“internationalization” can possibly mean. That is, the apparent
urgency of calls for internationalization does not necessitate
immediate clarity on this issue.
The term “international” refers to the space above and
between a world of separate nations. We might think that to be
internationalized would be in some way to know that space and
thereby to be able to order it and operate within it. The aspira209
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tion is not only to develop the skill to move in between and
across nations, but also to develop the capacity to stand in some
way above nations. Internationalists have long imagined an
impartial stance, a cosmopolitan view that joins nations by transcending the parochialism and antagonisms associated with the
nation-state system. In this sense at least, the project of internationalization appears intimately connected to the political architecture of modernity: the cosmopolitan longing that we might
transcend the partiality of our own way of life — our national
narrowness — depends paradoxically on a world of distinct
nations, peoples, and ways of life. To travel the world is to learn
about the other, to expand one’s horizon through the other in
order to arrive at a general view.
There are dangers in this way of thinking. We know that
knowledge of the other does not necessitate treating the other as
a subject, recognizing the equality but difference of the other. In
fact, certain kinds of knowledge appear to depend precisely on
rendering the other as an object. Were East and Central Europe
rendered objects of knowledge that I might use to overcome my
own partiality and parochialism? Were the speakers merely
agents of that process? While I am less than certain about the
answers to these questions, I am more certain that the kind of
cosmopolitan view I might have achieved by my participation in
the seminar should not count as a general or universal view.
Rather, the cosmopolitan view appears less as a universal stance
and more the particular viewpoint of those afforded the opportunity to move across boundaries and consume in a rich variety
of locales. As the representative of a particular social stratum in
global capitalism, the cosmopolitan can lay no more claim to the
universality of his or her view than can the “isolated” villager.
In fact, the opposite might be the case. Our contemporary attention to globalization has revealed a world of hybrid cultures and
civilizations, multinations, and polluted peoples. That is, most
of the world has already been internationalized and usually by
one form of force or another. Thus, we seek in vain for an other
that has not already been rendered at least partly us. We hope to
engage in a voluntary dialogue of equals with others who have
been forcibly interacting or integrated (as subordinates) into our
way of life for several centuries. It is only we, at the core of
global capitalism, whose own culture is often taken as the model
210
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for a homogenized world, who have the luxury to imagine internationalization as a vocation — the realization of a more universal self. We might more realistically see internationalization as a
responsibility we now bear given the success of our previous
commercial or military conquests.
While the project of internationalization as coming to know
the other seems to be partially destabilized by the very process
of globalization that is taken as its justification, we can identify
some, even if uncertain, basis for action in the world. Globalization is not merely something we have imposed on others: we
have done it to ourselves as well. Centuries of globalization
have made us a multination, have distributed peripheral economic activities within the core, have placed the other within
ourselves. Thus, we as scholars and teachers not only confront a
world of hybrid cultures, we confront the world as hybrids of
various sorts. At the same time we confront what is perceived as
an external other, we must also acknowledge and confront the
other within. And again, to know the other is not enough, for the
temptation is to know or suppress the other as an inferior, as
marginal — a process given a certain structure and magnified by
a global culture of competition. The challenge is to know the
other as an equal, and, though the same in certain respects, different in myriad others — to engage in the kind of dialogical
process by which the other (external and internal) becomes a
source of criticism for self, just as the self may be a source of criticism for the other. It appears to me that this is what we must do
as part of an effort to restore a more secure basis for agency in
the world.
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